Category: Intelligence

The declassified Intelligence Community Directive (ICD) 203 outlines the Directorate of National Intelligence’s desires for an analytically sound workforce. When I worked as an intelligence community (IC) analyst, I wore a laminate with the following analytic standards outlined:

• Objectivity
• Independent of political considerations
• Timeliness
• Based on all available sources of intelligence
• Exhibits proper standards of analytic tradecraft

These five standards became a mantra for when I would produce anything–from an interoffice memo to an intelligence assessment. As a member of the IC, I was required to uphold these values.

These analytic values are good for career segments, though. I like to consider them when I am drafting psychology publications or even writing an email at work. I like to rearrange them to the acronym TOBIE.

While my work within the IC is classified, I did complete advanced training on these topics as well as serve on at least one joint-duty assignment.

If you are going to read one article regarding countering violent extremism (CVE), this is the one I would recommend. Eric Rosand unpacks CVE strategies of Australia, Canada, and the US. He then provides two recommendations for the US:

1. Invest in and empower community-led efforts using funding from non-security/law enforcement agencies;
2. Be precise and judicious regarding public discourse on violent extremism;
3. Build trust with communities by using proper framing and terminology;
4. Involve non-security/law enforcement agencies in all aspects of CBE work;
5. Invest and mobilize resources/expertise to develop individual programs;
6. Share information regarding best practices and other information; and,
7. Pursue a federalized approach to counter violence.

While no country or CVE approach is going to be perfect, this is a great start at improving existing systems.

From several recently released studies using a sample of 66 ex-combatants and 66 control participants showed considerable similarities in all investigated areas except one: Moral judgment. The 66 ex-combatants were incarcerated in Columbia and former paramilitary operators.

Baez, S., Herrera, E., Trujillo, N., Manes, F., Young, L., & Ibañez, A. (2016). Aberrant moral judgment in extremist terrorists. International Journal of Psychophysiology, 108. Doi:10.1016/j.iipsycho.2016.07.344

Baez, S., Herrera, E., Garcia, A. M., Manes, F., Young, L., & Ibañez, A. (2017). Outcome-oriented moral evaluation in terrorists. Nature Human Behaviour, 1. doi:10.1038/s41562-017-0118

A few hours ago, London experienced one of the most recent terrorist attacks. Attacks like this are becoming more common place, sadly, around the world and even in Western countries.

Since the terrorism research field beginnings, researchers have run across a number of problems in trying to predict individuals who may commit an act of violence or terrorism. Gill (2015) identified eight core problems to this understanding:

1. The number of supposed indicators;
2. Base rates of these indicators;
3. Lack of understanding protective factors;
4. Weighting of these factors;
5. Behavior clustering;
6. Aggregated understanding of “terrorists”;
7. Sequencing these behaviors; and,
8. The “time” factor.

While there will likely never be a silver bullet to identifying potential terrorists or others who commit violent acts before they strike, there are several models in the field that attempt to provide some insight.

• Researchers Meloy and Gill (2016) provided an 18 characteristic approach to identifying potential terrorists. In their article, they reviewed over 111 lone-actor terrorists and applied this protocol—labeled the Terrorism Radicalization Assessment Protocol (TRAP-18)—to these actors. Of the 18 characteristics, there were five that scored at 80% prevalence or higher: Framed by an Ideology; Changes in thinking or emotion; Failure of the sexual-intimate pair bonding; pathway warning behavior; and, leakage. These 111 lone-actors represented the spectrum of what we call terrorism—Islamic extremism, extreme right-wing, and single-issue.
• Another set of researchers, Cole et al. (2014) provided a list of 16 risk indicators which span from cultural/religious isolation to overseas combat. The focus of this assessment protocol was geared mainly toward police and intelligence organizations that would be reviewing over a suspect’s Facebook or social media account.

Like the other end of the CVE sphere, there is not really a single approach. However, there are multiple thoughts to how to mitigate this problem. This is a good thing, especially as we move forward in research and engagement of this topic.

In my own research, I am attempting to apply the former risk factors against a sample of sovereign citizens who have committed violence. I am sure I will be providing details of this in the near future. But, I am curious to know if anyone else has had any success with these or other risk factors on violent extremism.

References

Cole, J., Alison, E., Cole, B., Alison, L., & Weyers, J. (2014). Identifying vulnerable persons to violent extremism.

Gill, P. (2015). Toward a scientific approach to identifying and understanding indicators of radicalization and terrorist intent: Eight key problems. Journal of Threat Assessment and Management, 2(3-4), 187-191. doi:10.1037/tam0000047

Meloy, J. R., & Gill, P. (2016). The lone-actor terrorist and the TRAP-18. Journal of Threat Assessment and Management, 3(1), 37-52. doi:10.1037/tam0000061

Read the original here: https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/two-approaches-risk-factors-cve-sphere-darin-challacombe